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In the twenty-first century, the United States is experiencing the Global War on Terror (GWOT) which has been amazingly limited in scope compared to those at previous turns of centuries. It does not appear that a major conference will follow or that there will be any tangible manifestation of its conclusion in the near term, if at all. We
do not yet know what will follow. It could be that the seeds of the next war are being planted by this one just as the seeds of the GWOT can be argued to have been planted We live in a different world with different threats. It is faster and more interconnected; different ideologies compete with liberty and democracy (fascism and communism replaced by various religious extremisms). It is a world unsure of itself -is the U.S. the global hegemon? Is the world multi-polar? Is the U.S. still strong while other nations are rising or is the U.S. in decline?
1 Threats today are not only conventional but emanate from non-state actors and weak states as much as, or perhaps more than, from strong potential rivals -as well as within new domains such as cyberspace, not to mention natural and man-made disruptions to order. 2 What is the role of the U.S. in today's world -merely to survive in the world or to shape the world? Or both? These questions too are critical in determining a strategy for this century.
On the tenth anniversary of 9/11 and the start of the GWOT, retired Lieutenant General James M. Dubik charged that the United States had lost its ability at the strategic level. 3 He said that strategists "cling to the notion that war is best defined conventionally" and that we lack "strategic imagination". 4 Dubik may be pulling away, perhaps unwittingly, from a classic definition of war as offered by Clausewitz.
Clausewitz defines war as the use "of force to compel our enemy to do our will" 5 and that the force to be used is military force. 6 LTG Dubik's challenge that the U.S. lacks strategic imagination and that American security professionals find themselves regularly "attempting to fit a round peg into a square hole" 7 may be reflective of their being leashed to Clausewitz's definition of war. Clausewitz's definition may be insufficient, particularly for warfare today.
As at the turn of the centuries of the last several hundred years, the twenty-first century finds itself embroiled in new kinds of war. Great world changes are also taking place including the speed of communication and the impact of globalization. Old notions of war, while still valid and very useful, are no longer sufficient for thinking about war in the new century. The use of force alone is not enough to break the will of enemies and to advance the interests of the United States. War must include the use of all elements of national power -diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME). Indeed, effective integration of national power may prevent war in the first place.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a strategic theory and framework that address the nature and conduct of war in the twenty-first century: the integration of DIME. This paper will examine the classical theory of war as well as notions of what peace looks like. It will present an enhanced way of defining war in today's strategic environment, discuss why wars are fought, how to fight and how to win wars or even how to prevent them. Finally, this paper will present practical operational recommendations for integrating the elements of power in advancing interests, preventing war, and fighting wars in the twenty-first century. Indeed, the U.S. must have an integrated approach to all elements of national power to advance its interests in this century. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it bluntly that military success is not sufficient and that other elements of national power are indispensable to lasting success and victory. 8 What is War and Peace?
Today's GWOT is often referred to as a long war. 9 The most recent long war for another to act in one's interests using a variety of means including, but not limited to, military force. It is the need to compel that makes it war, not the element of power used to wage it. In many cases, the other elements will be more effective and result in longer lasting peace than the use of military force would achieve (or at least somewhere on the continuum other than war). 26 This notion of why one must go to war is consistent with classical explanations of why nations fight. Clausewitz says "the political object is the original motive for war", 27 that the reason we go to war is based on political circumstances. 28 Even though
Clausewitz's definition of war is rooted in the use of force, his reasons for war do not exclude the use of other elements of power to achieve the political object that drive us to war. The litany of reasons to go to war presented by another classical theorist, Antoine Henri Jomini, does not conflict with the notion of fighting wars with elements of power other than military force; in fact, most of his reasons are broad enough that other elements could be used effectively without having to visit the destruction of military force. 29 Both of these theorists illuminate why nations go to war, though they differ from the definition of war asserted in this paper.
Modern theorist James Nathan suggests that nations go to war to pursue either interests (Nathan does not define interests but they can be described as what benefits a state or other actor) or passions (which he generally describes as religious or nationalist purposes). 30 He argues that since the Treaty of Westphalia, rational diplomats and soldiers work toward "the achievement of a favorable peace" 31 which essentially consists of attaining as many of your interests as you can. Interests lend themselves to compromise, reason and mutual gain (whereas passions do not) 32 . Thus it can be said that a nation can be reasonably satisfied with any state on the continuum (peace, cooperation, etc.) that serves its interests. If the interests cannot be met through negotiation or compromise or other resolution then there may be a need to compel the other in order "to attain a better peace" 33 somewhere on the continuum that better serves those interests. That is why there is war: the need to compel, through the use of any element of power, makes it war.
How To Fight
Hans Morgenthau wrote, "When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men." 34 The more power one has, the more one can make others to act in one's interests. States seek power, and use power to advance their own interests. The elements of power are applied to achieve interests in the relationship between states and actors along the continuum in Figure 1 . All elements can be effective in achieving interests through effective persuasion, finding common ground or deterrence. Even military power can be effective in peace, as when the mere prospect of its use deters conflict or persuades a potential adversary so that force need not be applied. 35 President Eisenhower was convinced that the other elements of power were "preeminent" when facing down communism. 36 All elements of power can be wielded along any point of the continuum, whether persuading, influencing or compelling another to act in our interests. 40 and his prescription to win them quickly. 41 However, wars inclusive of diplomacy, information and economics are likely to be consistent with his prescriptions for the least cost in lives 42 and without having to resort to fighting as previously stated above.
Nations therefore should fight with all elements of power sometimes in succession or simultaneously. The elements are interdependent in how they are applied. A strong military gives teeth to diplomacy. Diplomacy strengthens information warfare and economics strengthens all the other elements. This framework can guide strategists in which element to apply when and to what degree (one can say that strategy is choosing the appropriate elements of power and determining their application to achieve certain interests). This is an alternative to thinking about applying power and force in terms of limited and total (or all-out) war. Even Clausewitz stated that one uses force that is "sufficient" and that maintains "proportion." 43 Clausewitz was speaking in terms of the use of force but this guidance can be applied to the use of the other elements as well. Even better, economic warfare or diplomacy or information warfare may be sufficient to compel an enemy to act within one's wishes and render the use of force unnecessary.
Colin Powell stated that all war is limited. 44 Thus, an approach based on proportion is more relevant than a false dichotomy of limited and total. Proportionality is really trying to be achieved with sufficient -proportional -application.
How To Win
Clausewitz explains how to win war with his description of the center of gravity.
45
While he thought of the center of gravity as being an object for military force this is not necessarily always the case. In the current GWOT, ideology has been described as alQaeda's strategic center of gravity. 46 It takes more than military force to defeat this center of gravity. Other elements, such as information warfare, may be more effective just as certain uses of military force may actually be ineffective in targeting a center of gravity of ideology.
One must look at fighting the enemy's capabilities and will when examining how wars will be won. Clausewitz, again, is helpful in this understanding as he describes the necessity of reducing the enemy's capacity to resist, including both resources and will. JCS 1779 prescribed the need for German economic recovery, development of German democracy, civil rights and courts. 52 The Marshall Plan, through this directive, set the conditions of justice and functioning services while the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ratified in 1949 met the condition of security so desired by Germany and
Europeans at large. 53 The conditions of security, justice and functional services were set so that the U.S. could win the idea war over communism and the hearts and minds of Germans. Thus the seeds planted by the Marshall Plan were very different from the ones planted by the Treaty of Versailles twenty years earlier and very nearly replanted by the Morgenthau Plan.
In the last long war, the Cold War, U.S. strategists realized that the fundamental conflict was in the world of ideas and that even a military victory would only delay final resolution in that war of ideas. 54 That was not a foregone conclusion. Indeed, while the U.S. and its allies destroyed the German capacity to wage war in World War II, the While this environment has the potential to hold great opportunity and hope throughout the world it is also a volatile and dangerous one of transition. The U.S. is in the midst of a GWOT that has included both irregular and traditional conventional warfare. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues. 63 Conflict and war can come from any number of places. Thomas Barnett sees the future of conflict and war in regions of the world where there is economic and social instability. 64 Samuel Huntington posits that future conflict and war will occur along fault lines of civilizations. 65 A senior
American military official expressed recently what many think -that future war may be shifting to the Pacific region and the threat of China. 66 The challenges to the U.S.
diplomatic and military community are tremendous.
The National Security Strategy of the United States recognizes the multitude and complexity of threats in today's environment. 67 The two cornerstone agencies of America's national security, the Department of State and the Department of Defense, both outline today's environment and potential threats. 68 This integrated recognition of the world as it is today culminates in the identification of two dangerous and important categories of threat with nuclear and major regular war the most dangerous yet least likely and irregular war just as important and the most likely. 69 Indeed some combination, or hybrid, such as a non-state actor using WMD or a state using irregular proxies is very possible. 70 This environment demands a strategy that is creative just as LTG Dubik challenged and as comprehensive as Secretary Gates insisted.
Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, deals with the ever increasing issues of fragile states, both those in danger of breaking down and those in post-conflict such as in the GWOT. 71 He refers back to the post World War Two period and the Cold War when national strategists had "one big idea: the nexus among economics, governance, and security." 72 Sixty years later he recognizes the conditions necessary to win the war of ideas that his Cold War predecessors did. Zoellick calls for "securing development" as a "framework of building security, legitimacy, governance and economy." 73 This "securing development" is an integration of DIME. It is a strategy of essentially winning hearts and minds and the war of ideas -possibly the center of gravity in this century -and is a strategy that could advance U.S. interests in the world and bring lasting peace from conflict.
Strategy is the relationship between ends, ways and means. 74 In a national security context ends can be identified as national interests, ways as the elements of power and means as specifically how the elements of power are applied. In essence, strategy in the national security realm is selecting the appropriate elements of power to advance national interests. This paper has laid out the theoretical framework for such a strategy in the twenty-first century environment to both win wars and to prevent them.
That strategy is a deliberate and coherent integration of DIME. Such a strategy is referred to in the current U.S. National Security Strategy, described as a "whole of government" 75 approach in the context of "engagement" 76 to advance the enduring national interests of security, prosperity, universal human values, and international order and stability. 77 Recommendations for a Twenty-First Century Strategy
The whole of government approach hits the mark of what is needed in this century -a unity of effort 78 integrating the application of the elements of power to both prevent war and to win wars. This approach must transcend future administrations just as containment did during the Cold War. While it is critical to recognize the value and necessity of integrating DIME in addressing security challenges it is also important to think about how that integration looks, about the "means" of such a strategy. That is beyond the scope of this paper and worthy of further research. However, the interagency 3D Planning Guide addressing diplomacy, development and defense is an Though organized similar to the National Guard, this institution would be civilian and not military. This institution would work across the elements of power in its diplomatic, economic and information impact.
Military. Our Armed Forces must be designed and trained to operate along the full spectrum of operations to include "securing development" (with emphasis on "securing" when performing that mission). The broad range of potential threats requires a dominant military capable to perform across that range. However, the military does not need to become a development pool. It is not good at that. Whether it is through digging wells in southern Afghanistan to provide jobs and win hearts and minds but inadvertently lowering the water table in the process and harming long term agriculture 84 to other projects that are either unwanted, ineffective or become targets, the military does not have the expertise to identify and administer development. 85 That is a distraction from its mission and thus where an organization such as CRP comes into play. The military's mission is to prevail in today's war, prevent and deter conflict and to prepare to win future wars by applying the military element of power. 86 To do that it must be robust, expeditionary and consist of a competent, well trained operational active force and operational reserve with strategic assets. 87 It must be large enough and lethal enough to be feared and thus serve as a credible dynamic deterrent that gives teeth to all elements of national power.
Information. During the Cold War, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) served as steward and proponent of winning the war of ideas between democracy and communism. As part of the "peace dividend" it was abolished and its functions rolled into the State Department. The Obama Administration reviewed the U.S. approach to strategic communication at the direction of Congress in 2010. It found that there is no need to change direction in how the U.S. implements the information element of power. 88 That may be the case however it needs further investigation. There exists a strong argument that an agency responsible for its own element of power should not be responsible for integrating others. 89 It stands to reason that if ideas are often the center of gravity in today's wars and the key to affecting an enemies' will, the element of power most relevant to that center of gravity and enemies' will should have its own institutional steward and appropriate prominence.
National Security Education. The U.S. national security establishment Private universities and colleges offer a variety of educational degrees which impact on security education. The National Security Education Program (NSEP) was established by the National Security Education Act of 1991 to educate students in language and cultures but to date just over 2,000 students have participated in the program. 90 American security professionals need a more comprehensive security education that covers the security establishment, theory, strategy, and leadership in addition to language and cultural studies. This level of education along with frequent agency exchanges must be required of more security professionals earlier in their careers to assure success of effective integration of DIME today.
These recommendations are not all encompassing; indeed more can be addressed in the area of economics which was so vital to winning the Cold War and has been such a key part of the strategy of the GWOT. But these recommendations are a starting point for further research in implementing a strategy of integrating DIME for preventing and winning wars in the twenty-first century.
Conclusion
Both B.H. Liddell Hart and Sun Tzu are probably correct that the best strategy to win war is without fighting. An integration of DIME within a whole of government approach of engagement and "securing development" may best advance U.S. interests along the continuum of peace thru conflict (see Figure 1 , page 6). Diplomacy, information and economic elements of power can be waged in these spheres effectively without using military force. In fact, the best use of military force may simply be its strength behind the other elements as they are applied along these points of the continuum (as Al Capone famously said, "You get much farther with a kind word and a gun than with a kind word alone.") 91 . However, as history shows even today in the GWOT, the U.S. will find itself in the necessary position to compel other actors to act in its interests wherever that threat comes from. Military force alone will not accomplish this.
U.S. security professionals need to think precisely about the nature of the U.S.
relationship with states and non-state actors who threaten its interests and think creatively about how to compel them to act in its interests if their threats cannot be otherwise resolved. The U.S. often cooperates with other nations. It can even compete with other nations without hostility or compulsion. When there are conflicting interests the U.S. can resolve them peacefully as long as all parties seek such resolution. But there are times when its enemies will not seek compromise. There are times when the U.S. will be compelled to compel them to act in its interests. That is when the U.S. is at war with them. Sometimes the U.S. will need to act with proportional force (that is, of sufficient and no less amount), 92 sometimes proportionally with other elements of power and, at times, with all the elements. 93 It is not a matter of using soft power or hard power; it is a matter of wielding all power available effectively.
This paper has presented a modified definition of war that expands the options in developing creative strategy for this century both to prevent and to win wars. Classical theorists such as Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and many others help to understand why nations fight, how they fight and how war will be won in this century. Their logic applies within the modified definition of war asserted in this paper, which includes the use of other elements of power in addition to military force. The international order is in transition and the dynamics of today's world are volatile and ever changing. Clearly, this analysis only scratches the surface of war in the twenty-first century. In a world that is becoming more interconnected more quickly it is ideas that matter most; those are often the center of gravity. That is the war that will in the end advance the interests of the United States.
The only way to win that war is with an integrated approach to using all elements of power to advance U.S. interests. Several lines of future thought have been presented in this paper for making this integration effective. These are lines of thought worth pursuing in the attempt to think more imaginatively about strategy. Not only must the U.S. integrate DIME, it must do so effectively.
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